No. In this paper we use a regression discontinuity approach to investigate whether a¤ordable housing policies in ‡uenced origination or a¤ected prices of subprime mortgages. We use merged loan-level data on non-prime securitized mortgages with individualand neighborhood-level data for California and Florida. We …nd no evidence that lenders increased subprime originations or altered pricing around the discrete eligibility cuto¤s for the Government Sponsored Enterprises' (GSEs) a¤ordable housing goals or the Community Reinvestment Act. Our results indicate that the extensive purchases of risky private-label mortgage-backed securities by the GSEs were not due to a¤ordable housing mandates.
Introduction
Congress has enacted laws to encourage lending to low-income households and households that have historically been excluded from mortgage markets because of the neighborhoods in which they live. Some observers have argued that a¤ordable housing policy was a causal factor in the subprime crisis and that the aim of Congress in enacting such policies is more sinister. For instance, writing in the Financial Times, Raghuram Rajan (2010) writes " [t] he tsunami of money directed by a U.S. Congress, worried about growing income inequality, towards expanding low income housing, joined with the ‡ood of foreign capital in ‡ows to remove any discipline on home loans."Charles Calomiris (2009) goes further in stating that "the politicization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the actions of members of Congress to encourage reckless lending by the GSEs [Government Sponsored Enterprises] in the name of a¤ordable housing were arguably the most damaging policy actions leading up to the crisis."
The Republican minority on the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform described Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as "the central cancer of the mortgage market, which has now metastasized into the current …nancial crisis" (Davis, 2008) . Greenspan (2010) also asserts that a¤ordable housing policies played a key role in the subprime crisis.
In this paper, we use data on non-prime mortgages originated in 2005 in California and Florida to examine the in ‡uence of a¤ordable housing policies on subprime loan pricing and the volume of originations. All mortgages in our sample were securitized into private-label mortgage-backed securities (PLMBS). As shown in Table 1 , almost 70% of such mortgages satis…ed one or more of the a¤ordable housing goals. These mortgages were not intended to be purchased by the GSEs as whole loans to later be packaged into agency MBS. Rather, the GSEs gained exposure to these mortgages through their purchases of PLMBS.
To identify the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing goals, we use a regression discontinuity approach to ascertain whether the goals led to a di¤erence in either mortgage rates or subprime loan volume. We look at the e¤ects of the two main a¤ordable housing policies enacted by Congress. The …rst policy we examine is the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977.
The CRA encourages depository institutions to lend to low-income communities and to lowincome individuals. While the CRA does not have an explicit racial component, the high correlation between the racial and income characteristics of neighborhoods and individuals implies that the CRA indirectly addresses concerns about racial disparities in credit access. 1 The second policy we examine is the mandate of the two main GSEs to promote a¤ordable housing. Since 1992, Congress has given Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac numerical targets for the share of their lending to areas with large shares of minority residents or large shares of low-income households (the underserved areas goal [UAG] ), borrowers with very low income or borrowers with low income living in Census tracts with low income (the special a¤ordable goal [SAG] ), and borrowers with low-to-moderate income (the low-to-moderate-income goal [LMIG] ).
Importantly, the GSEs can satisfy their a¤ordable housing goals by purchasing packages of securitized mortgages that they cannot otherwise purchase as whole loans. Part 81.16 of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations makes it clear that a qualifying loan acquired by a GSE via a purchase of PLMBS will generally count towards the GSE's a¤ordable housing goals.
Indeed, the GSEs vastly increased their purchases of PLMBS during the subprime mortgage boom. Manchester (2008) and Frame (2008) claim that the GSEs generally purchased "goal rich" PLMBS during the subprime boom. Depository institutions may also count PLMBS toward their CRA goals provided the MBS are structured as CRA-quali…ed securities.
In contrast to studies of the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing goals in the prime market (e.g., Ambrose and Thibodeau,2004; Bhutta, 2010 Bhutta, , 2011 , we …nd no evidence that a¤ordable housing legislation a¤ected the subprime market during the subprime crisis. Lending volumes, loan pricing, and default rates do not change in response to the goals. It remains possible that the GSEs encouraged subprime lending by purchasing large quantities of PLMBS. How-ever, our results indicate that any role the GSEs played in the subprime crisis was not due to their a¤ordable housing mandates.
Our approach di¤ers from the existing literature on the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing policy in four important respects. First, our dataset allows us to focus speci…cally on subprime mortgages whereas most of the existing literature (e.g., Ambrose and Thibodeau, 2004; Berry and Lee. 2008; Bhutta 2010 Bhutta , 2011 has studied the e¤ects of a¤ordable housing policy on the overall mortgage market or other housing market outcomes (e.g., home ownership rates by Bostic and Gabriel, 2006 ). An important exception is the study by Reid and Laderman (2011) which uses high-cost loans as a proxy for subprime loans.
Second, the majority of subprime loans were securitized such that a complete picture of the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing legislation requires an evaluation of the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing policies on securitized loans. The previous literature has focused on mortgages the GSEs and CRA-regulated institutions were likely to acquire as whole loans. For example, Bhutta (2010) excludes from his sample all loans originated by lenders on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) designated subprime lender list because the GSEs are not to purchase these loans as whole loans. Similarly, Reid and Laderman (2011) study whether CRA-regulated institutions are more likely to originate high-cost loans than institutions not covered by the CRA.
In contrast to Reid and Laderman (2011) , our approach to identifying the e¤ect of the CRA uses a regression discontinuity approach. We use this approach because CRA-regulated lenders may get credit for CRA-eligible loans they buy on the secondary market; our approach thus does not assume that the lender gets credit only for loans it originates. The regulations regarding CRA compliance stipulate that not all qualifying loans in a MBS that a depository institution acquires may be used to ful…ll the goal (O¢ ce of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., 1997). Rather, MBS structured speci…cally to help an institutional MBS purchaser meet the CRA goals will generally count toward ful…lling the requirement. Importantly, the regression discontinuity approach allows us to capture the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing legislation on securitized loans.
Third, the existing literature has focused on whether a¤ordable housing legislation changed the total volume of loans made to target populations. 2 We also examine whether a¤ordable housing legislation made subprime loans cheaper than they otherwise would have been or led to di¤erences in loan performance. Financial and technological innovation has made risk-based pricing of credit, rather than mere credit allocation, a more relevant issue in recent years. This is especially true in the subprime market, where lenders were much less likely to sell the whole loan to a GSE and were thus less constrained by …rm cuto¤s on variables such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, loan size, and FICO score. In a world in which lenders cope with credit risk by rationing credit, a¤ordable housing legislation is likely to manifest itself as an increase in the number of loans made to target households. In contrast, when borrowers choose among several di¤erent sets of loan terms, each with a di¤erent price, a¤ordable housing legislation may manifest itself in a reduction in the price of credit.
Finally, we examine the e¤ect of all of the GSEs'a¤ordable housing goals and both of the CRA goals rather than simply the neighborhood-level goals. Some of the GSEs'a¤ordable housing goals and one of the CRA goals are aimed at encouraging lending to households living in particular Census tracts. Tract-level goals can be studied using originations per tract as an outcome measure. However, the aim of several other targets that is to encourage lending to households with low incomes. To study these goals, we look at pricing and loan performance.
In the next section, we outline the a¤ordable housing legislation we study and describe our empirical methodology. We describe the data and the algorithm used to merge them in Section 3. We present our results in Section 4 and provide concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 See, for example, Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) , Berry and Lee (2008 ), and Bhutta (2010 , 2011 .
Empirical Methodology
To assess whether a¤ordable housing legislation led directly or indirectly to the subprime housing boom, we must …rst examine the mechanisms through which the change in laws could a¤ect lending behavior. We investigate whether the enactment of these laws led to a change in lender behavior to meet the programs'objectives. For example, changes in lending behavior could manifest as a relaxation in lending standards or a change in mortgage pricing. In this section, we outline the program objectives. We then describe three channels through which lenders could respond to the programs' objectives, thereby inducing a boom in subprime securities. We then test whether lender behavior did indeed change for these variables just below the programs'cuto¤s.
The A¤ordable Housing Goals
The a¤ordable housing goals for the CRA and the GSEs are actually seven separate goals.
Two of the goals are CRA goals and …ve are the GSEs'a¤ordable housing targets. Some of the goals apply to borrowers living within a particular Census tract and some of the goals are speci…c to individual borrowers regardless of where they live. The loans that satisfy each of the goals are as follows: 
Identifying the E¤ect of A¤ordable Housing Legislation
One direct way to determine whether a¤ordable housing legislation contributed to the subprime securities boom is to measure the extent to which the laws led to more originations for the targeted groups than for other groups. For the tract-speci…c goals (CRA1, UAG1, and UAG2), we test whether there is a statistically signi…cant increase in originations per
Census tract divided by tract population just below versus just above the program cuto¤.
In this case, the dependent variable is the number of originations, a tract-level rather than a borrower-level variable. An increase in the number of originations would suggest that lenders made a conscious attempt to make loans to borrowers in the target group, which could have led to the subprime securities boom.
Another channel through which the programs could have encouraged lending is by inducing lenders to lower prices for the target groups. For all goals, we can test whether there is a discontinuity in the interest rate the borrower receives just above versus just below the program cuto¤. Thus, the dependent variable in these tests is the mortgage rate charged at origination.
A third channel through which the programs could have encouraged lending is by relaxing lending standards, that is, by lending to borrowers targeted by the program who have an unusually high probability of defaulting on the loan. To explore this possibility, we can examine whether the programs a¤ected the probability of default by the target group of borrowers. Thus, the dependent variable for these tests is a binary indicator of whether the borrower had a serious default within the …rst two years of origination. We follow the industry standard in de…ning a serious default as delinquency of 90 days or more or termination through foreclosure.
Regression Discontinuity Design
We can evaluate the a¤ordable housing programs by estimating their e¤ect on the variables in the preceding subsection using a regression discontinuity approach (Thistlethwaite and Campbell,1960) which takes advantage of the precise cuto¤s in the objectives of the a¤ordable housing programs. The regression discontinuity approach has been used widely in economics and …nance to improve identi…cation of a "treatment"on a variable of interest, Y . Suppose that Y changes smoothly with an observable variable, X, and the treatment, a¤ordable housing legislation in our case, is applied only to individuals whose X is restricted to be either below (or above) a known threshold c. The e¤ect of the treatment can be identi…ed from the di¤erence between X's e¤ect on individuals just above and just below c. Loutskina and Strahan (2009), Roberts and Su… (2009) , Garmaise and Natividad (2010) , and Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2011) provide recent applications of the regression discontinuity approach in the …nance literature. Lee and Lemieux (2010) survey its uses in other areas of economics.
To formalize, our regression discontinuity design begins by …rst considering the following regression: Lee and Lemieux, 2010) for additional discussion of the use of covariates in regression discontinuity designs).
The treatment e¤ect would be straightforward to estimate if the model were truly globally
linear. An advantage of the regression discontinuity approach is that it relies only on local smoothness in the e¤ect of the observable variable X to identify the treatment e¤ect. To exploit this, we can restrict our attention to loans just above and just below the program cuto¤. Thus, when estimating the baseline model, we include only data within a band of 2% of the goal cuto¤. For example, to evaluate the e¤ect of the CRA, we estimate using only loans made in Census tracts with median income of 78% to 82% of the MSA median income. The treatment group, i.e., the loans for which the indicator variable, I [X<c] ; takes a value of 1, are loans made in Census tracts with median income of 78% to 80% of that of the MSA. The size of the band, in this case, 2% on each side of the cuto¤, must be small enough to ensure smoothness but large enough to obtain a su¢ cient amount of data. In a later section, we experiment with the bandwidth size to verify the robustness of our results.
For the regression discontinuity approach, we also must assume that agents (i.e., borrowers) cannot control X, which is innocuous for the a¤ordable housing criteria applied to an area (e.g., a Census tract). However, in three cases (CRA2, SAG2, and LMIG), the goal is de…ned for an individual's income alone. Thus, it is possible that a borrower could report income just below the threshold to qualify for treatment. This assumes, however, that borrowers are keenly aware of the goals and they know lenders will, say, lower their mortgage rate. We address these issues in Section 4.2.
In addition to the linear model, we can estimate the e¤ects of the a¤ordable housing legislation on, for example, the probability of default. For the regression discontinuity model of default, we must modify the linear speci…cation (1) to account for the binary default indicator as the dependent variable. This is also straightforward in the regression discontinuity framework, as the underlying assumption is smoothness as opposed to linearity. Thus, we can estimate the standard probit model augmented with the treatment indicator and restricted to the loans just above and just below the program cuto¤. We can then assess whether the programs had an e¤ect on the probability of default as
where D is the default indicator and (:) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
In the case of a¤ordable housing programs, the cuto¤s are based on either borrower income or Census tract characteristics as described in Section 2:1. The advantage of our regression discontinuity approach is that we need not know who the …nal holder of the loan is. This point is important because …nancial institutions receive credit for loans that they acquire by purchasing securitized pools, not just the loans they originate or acquire as whole loans. The majority of subprime loans were securitized such that the originator is highly unlikely to be the …nal holder of the loan. Because depository institutions and the GSEs can satisfy their a¤ordable housing goals by purchasing securitizations, whether the originator is subject to the CRA, whether the loan is in the …nancial institution's CRA assessment area, and whether the loan is conforming conveys at best incomplete information about the impact of the regulations.
In total, we estimate our three outcome measures on the following subsamples of the population of loans:
1. CRA1: Loans in Census tracts with median income of 78% 82% of MSA median income.
2. CRA2: Loans to borrowers with income of 78% 82% of MSA median income.
3. UAG1: Loans in Census tracts with a minority population of 28% 32% and with a median income of no more than 120% of MSA median income.
4. UAG2: Loans in Census tracts with median income of 88% 92% of MSA median income.
5. SAG1: Loans to borrowers with income of 58% 62% of MSA median income.
6. SAG2: Loans to borrowers with income of 78% 82% of MSA median income and who live in a Census tract with median income of 78% 82% of MSA median income. For SAG2, the treatment group is the set of borrowers that have an income of 78% 80% of MSA median income and who live in a Census tract with a median income of 78% 80%
of MSA median income.
7. LMIG: Loans to borrowers with income of 98% 102% of MSA median income.
If any of the a¤ordable housing goals a¤ect the subprime market, we would expect to see a discontinuity in originations, interest rates, or default rates related to either 1) the median income in the Census tract relative to the MSA, 2) the minority population share in the Census tract, or 3) the ratio of borrower income to median MSA income. This would manifest in the statistical signi…cance of the coe¢ cient .
In all models, we include the goal variable (e.g., tract-to-MSA income ratio in the regressions and probit for CRA1) as a control. In the regressions for the number of originations,
we always include year dummies. In the regressions for the rate and the probits, we include dummies for the month of origination. As a robustness check, we include other covariates in the equations. (1968) and the CRA. We restrict our sample to loans made in metropolitan areas because rural originations are often exempt from the HMDA reporting requirements.
Merging Datasets
The matching procedure considers …rst-lien loans with the same purpose (purchase or re…-nance) and occupancy status (owner-occupied). CL associates each loan with a 5-digit U.S.
Postal Service ZIP code, whereas HMDA loans are associated with Census tracts. To match ZIP codes with Census tracts we used Census Bureau ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs). 4 We also use the geographic information systems program ArcView to establish Census tract search areas associated with any given ZCTA as follows: For each loan in CL, we determined the smallest set of Census tracts that intersect with the associated ZCTA and we allowed for the union of the Census tracts in the intersection to extend over the geographic area de…ned by any given ZCTA.
Except for the use of ZCTAs, we followed Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy's (2009) Stage 4 is similar to stage 3 but ignores originator names.
Stage 5 is similar to stage 1 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the CL amount.
Stage 6 is similar to stage 2 but loan amounts are matched to within 2.5% of the CL amount.
At the conclusion of each stage, only one-to-one matches are kept and are removed from the datasets, while loans with multiple matches (either one CL loan to many HMDA loans or many CL loans to one HMDA loan) are returned to the matching pool for the subsequent stages. We also applied various data checks to the …nal sample of loans, including dropping observations with missing or erroneous FICO scores and dropping observations with contract rates smaller than the reported HMDA spread of the loan's annual percentage rate with a Treasury security of comparable maturity. For additional details on the matching algorithm, see the appendix of Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009) . We are able to match 67% and 83% of the CL loans in California and Florida, respectively, with HMDA data.
We focus on mortgages packaged into PLMBS because much of the controversy surrounding the GSEs regards their holdings of PLMBS. There is good reason for concern regarding the GSEs' holdings of these securities. In this paper, we do not dispute the role of PLMBS in the GSEs'downfall. Our question is whether the a¤ordable housing mandates were responsible for the GSEs'role in this market.
We focus on 30-year adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) as we have the most data for these product types; our samples for other product types are much smaller, making it more di¢ cult to detect any regression discontinuity that may exist. Our 30-year ARM de…nition emphasizes amortization; all mortgages in our sample amortize on a 30 year schedule. We focus on a single product type as the regression discontinuity approach works better with greater uniformity in the variable of interest along other dimensions.
In our analysis, we focus on the initial contract interest rate rather than the annual percentage rate (APR) or the margin for the ARM because there is little evidence that lenders price the default or prepayment risk of subprime ARMs using the reset rate (see Haughwout, Mayer, and Tracy, 2009 and Ghent, Hernández-Murillo, and Owyang, 2011 for discussions of this issue). The reason lenders seem to price ARMs using the initial contract rate is that a large fraction of mortgages terminate before they reach the reset date (see, e.g., Demyanyk, 2009 ) such that the reset rate that the margin determines is largely a hypothetical interest rate. As such, it is highly unlikely that originators o¤er a lower margin to borrowers whose loans meet the housing goal criteria. Because the APR is computed assuming the mortgage is held to maturity, it largely also re ‡ects the reset rate, a rate that is hypothetical for most borrowers. Table 1 contains summary statistics on the loans in our sample. In total, our sample contains 722; 157 loans. Only 30% of the loans in our sample do not satisfy any of the a¤ordable housing goals. More than half the loans (56%) are in Census tracts with a minority share of at least 30% such that they satisfy the GSEs'UAG1 goal. More than half the loans (54%) also satisfy the GSEs' UAG2 goal insofar as they are for properties in Census tracts with tract income no more than 90% of that of the MSA. About 40% of the loans are made to borrowers in Census tracts with tract income of no more than 80% of MSA income such that they meet the CRA1 goal.
Summary Statistics
A smaller proportion of the loans meet the borrower-speci…c a¤ordable housing goals than satisfy the tract-speci…c a¤ordable housing goals. Only 27% of the loans are to borrowers with less than the median MSA income such they qualify for the GSEs'LMIG goal. Only 14% of the loans are made to households with income of less than 80% of the MSA's income such that they meet the CRA's borrower-speci…c component (CRA2). A mere 5% of loans are made to households with income of less than 60% of the median MSA income such that they meet the SAG1 criterion.
The …rst three rows of Table 1 provide further evidence that subprime loans were not made to households that stated they had low incomes but were disproportionately originated in low-income and minority neighborhoods. The average borrower-to-MSA median income ratio in our sample is 173% which indicates that the typical subprime borrower had a much higher stated income than the typical household in the MSA. The typical borrower in our sample lived in a Census tract where 47% of the population belonged to a racial minority and where the income in the Census tract was lower than that of the MSA.
The picture that emerges of the subprime borrower is that of a high-income household that lives in a low-income neighborhood. Given the level of misrepresentation in the low documentation or no documentation loans (see, e.g., Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, 2011) , it is quite possible that the di¤erence between the borrower's and the neighborhood's income is due to income misreporting. Fewer than half the loans in our sample are made with full documentation but even the full documentation loans may have overstated income.
Regardless of the reason for the di¤erence between the stated income of the borrower and the income in his or her neighborhood, the stated income determines eligibility for the borrowerspeci…c goals such that few of the loans in our sample qualify for the borrower-speci…c goals.
The remaining characteristics of the loan in our sample are as follows:
Average loan amount: $296; 844
Average FICO score in our sample is 632. This is consistent with the typical characterization of a subprime loan as one made to a borrower with a weak credit history
Loans with a prepayment penalty at origination: 89% Loans made to re…nance an existing loan (rather than to purchase a property): 65%
Average interest rate at origination: 6:74%
Loans defaulting within 2 years of origination: 15%
Loans originated in Florida: 39%.
Results

Baseline Results
Figures 1 Figure 3 shows the relationship between the average borrower interest rate and the tract-to-MSA median income ratio; Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the average borrower interest rate and the percent of minority residents in the Census tract. Figure 5 plots the relationship between the average borrower interest rate and the borrower-to-MSA income ratio.
If either the CRA1 or UAG1 goals fueled the subprime mortgage boom, we would expect to see a discontinuity around 80% (CRA1) or 90% (UAG1) in Figures 1 and 3 . No discontinuity exists around either of these points. Similarly, in …gures 2 and 4, we would
Figure 1: E¤ect of CRA1 and GSEs'UAG2 on Origination Volumes
Points are associated with data from all loans from 2 percentage points below the cuto¤ to the cuto¤ itself (e.g., 80% point summarizes mean number of originations per tract for all tracts that have median income of 78 to 80% of MSA income).
expect to see a discontinuity around 30% (UAG1) if the minority share goal for the GSEs has an e¤ect on the subprime market. We see no such e¤ect. Finally, an e¤ect of the borrower-speci…c a¤ordable housing goals would result in a discontinuity at 60% (SAG1), 80% (CRA2 and SAG2), or 100% (LMIG) in Figure 5 . The results are striking: There is no visible discontinuity in either interest rates or loan originations in any of the …gures. Although we do not …nd an e¤ect in origination volumes, the volume of originations is 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of originations in the tract divided by tract population.
not well suited to studying the borrower-level goals using our data. 6 It remains possible that some or all of the borrower-level goals described in the previous section have an e¤ect on the subprime market. One way the goals might manifest themselves is by borrowers receiving a lower interest rate if they meet one or more of the program goals. Alternatively, a¤ordable housing policies may lead to lenders holding borrowers to a lower standard because of the bene…t lenders receive by complying with the a¤ordable housing policies. If lenders apply a lower quality threshold to loans that satisfy the a¤ordable housing goals, we would thus expect to see lower performance for loans that satisfy the goals. To look at the borrower-level goals, we thus also look at the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing goals on interest rates and default. that the a¤ordable housing goal increases rather than lowers the cost of borrowing for eligible borrowers. Furthermore, the e¤ect of the goals on the cost of borrowing is never signi…cant once we include a broader set of controls for loan-level characteristics.
7 Table 4 illustrates the e¤ect of the a¤ordable housing goals on the performance of the loan. The dependent variable in the probit is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the loan goes into serious default (i.e., experiences a delinquency of 90 days or more or terminates through foreclosure) within two years of origination. The table shows the marginal e¤ects of a change in the dependent variable on the likelihood of default. The goal 6 One could use the HMDA data alone to determine the likelihood of a loan application being denied to study the e¤ect of the borrower-speci…c a¤ordable housing goals on the volume of originations. However, the HMDA data do not indicate the …nal disposition of the loan (i.e., whether the loan is held by the originator in portfolio, securitized by the GSEs, or securitized in a PLMBS) since the data are collected at loan origination. The interest of this paper is speci…cally on PLMBS such that we focus on rates and performance to measure the e¤ects of the borrower-speci…c goals on the subprime market. 7 The other controls are the FICO score, the LTV ratio at origination, the origination amount, a dummy for whether the loan was full documentation, a dummy for whether the loan was for re…nancing, a dummy for whether the loan was originated in California, a dummy for whether the loan required the borrower to pay PMI, and a dummy for whether the loan had a prepayment penalty. percentage points of the goal cuto¤. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is the contract interest rate. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract.
variables are statistically insigni…cant with two exceptions. The coe¢ cients indicate that a loan that is eligible for the UAG2 goal by virtue of being made in a tract with median income less than or equal to 90% of that in the MSA is about 2% more likely to default. However, the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant only at the 10% level after we include other loan controls.
Furthermore, the results in Table 4 indicate that a loan made to a borrower with income less than the median income in the MSA is 2% less likely to default than one that did not qualify for the GSEs'LMIG goal. Overall, the results in Table 4 are not supportive of the notion that goal-eligible loans were of worse quality than goal-ineligible loans.
Robustness
We discussed above that the regression discontinuity approach may be sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth and the manipulation of reported income in response to the a¤ordable housing program goals. In this section, we consider whether these issues a¤ect our results.
First, we reestimate the discontinuity models with alternative bandwidths. We then address the possibility of income manipulation by focusing only on full documentation loans.
Alternative Bandwidths
It is possible that our chosen benchmark bandwidth of 2 percentage points is not the appropriate bandwidth for one of two reasons. The …rst possibility is that it is too broad such that our loans are not su¢ ciently similar along the key dimension of interest for evaluating the goal. If this is the case, our regressions will not pick up the e¤ect of the a¤ordable housing program. The second possibility is that our bandwidth is too small for us to have su¢ cient data to detect the e¤ect of the a¤ordable housing programs. To ensure our results are robust to these concerns, we also explore the e¤ect of the a¤ordable housing goals on all three outcome measures using 1-and 5-percentage-point windows. The results are quite similar to the benchmark results and are reported in the appendix in the interest of brevity. 3) ** and * denote signi…cance at 5% and 10% levels. 4) All probits also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is whether the loan defaults within two years of origination. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract. 7) Entries show marginal e¤ects averaged over all observations.
Full Documentation Loans Only
An important requirement for the regression discontinuity approach to be valid is that households and originators cannot precisely manipulate the assignment variable (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . In our case, the assignment variable may be either the income of the Census tract, the income of the borrower, or the minority share of the Census tract. Since the income and minority share of the Census tract are determined by HUD, clearly neither households nor originators can manipulate these assignment variables. However, it seems possible that the lender or borrower may be able to precisely manipulate income for low documentation or no documentation loans. As a result, for CRA2, SAG1, SAG2, and LMIG we consider the robustness of our results to a subsample that includes only full documentation loans. It is much more di¢ cult to see how the lender or borrower could precisely manipulate income for full documentation loans since the documentation is predetermined (e.g., W2s, income tax returns).
Restricting the sample to full documentation loans reduces our sample size by about 50%
but still leaves over 6; 000 observations to evaluate the e¤ect of CRA2, SAG2, and LMIG and over 600 observations to evaluate the e¤ect of SAG1. Table 5 reports the results of the rate regressions on the borrower-speci…c a¤ordable housing goals (CRA2, SAG1, SAG2, and LMIG) using only the subset of loans with full documentation. The results are similar in character to those in Table 3 . Three of the goal indicator variables (CRA2, SAG1, and LMIG) are signi…cant when we do not include the full set of controls. However, the sign of the goal variable for CRA2 and LMIG indicates that the programs in fact increase the cost of borrowing for borrowers who meet the program requirements. In all three cases, the e¤ect is less than 17 basis points and not statistically signi…cant when we use the full set of controls which suggests that the statistical signi…cance is due to merely to sampling uncertainty. Table 6 reports the results of the probit estimation of the e¤ect borrower-speci…c affordable housing goals on the likelihood of default. The results are quite similar to the full sample. The only borrower-speci…c goal indicator that is statistically signi…cant is that for percentage points of the goal cuto¤. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is the contract interest rate. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract.
LMIG (borrower income less than median MSA income) and the sign indicates that loans that satisfy the goal criterion are about 3% less likely to terminate through default.
Conclusions
In this paper we examined the e¤ect of a¤ordable housing legislation on the volume, pricing, and performance of subprime mortgages originated in California and Florida in 2004 through 2006 . Using a regression discontinuity approach, we …nd no evidence that the a¤ordable housing goals of the CRA or of the GSEs a¤ected any of these outcome measures. This …nding is robust to the inclusion of alternative controls, to the sample of only full documentation loans, and to di¤erent bandwidths for the regression discontinuity speci…cation.
While it is unquestionable that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held substantial amounts of subprime mortgages, and that their holdings of these securities played a signi…cant role in their demise, the evidence in this paper refutes the claim that the a¤ordable housing mandates were responsible for the risk-taking behavior of these two institutions. percentage points of the goal cuto¤. 3) ** and * denote signi…cance at 5% and 10% levels. 4) All probits also include a constant. 5)
The dependent variable is whether the loan defaults within two years of origination. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract. 7) Entries show marginal e¤ects averaged over all observations. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of originations in the tract / tract population. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is the contract interest rate. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of originations in the tract / tract population. 3)***, **, and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 4) All regressions also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is the contract interest rate. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract. 3) ** and * denote signi…cance at 5% and 10% levels. 4) All probits also include a constant. 5) The dependent variable is whether the loan defaults within two years of origination. 6) Standard errors are clustered by Census tract. 7) Entries show marginal e¤ects averaged over all observations.
